This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks' total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (topmanagers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.
Introduction
This paper aims to contribute to the study of public sector in Russia using the banking industry as a case. While the pervasiveness of the public sector in Russia is broadly recognized, it is not a simple task to document it carefully. Clear-cut "black-and-white" distinction between forms of ownership (public versus private) does not exist, and we identify fairly many state-influenced banks where the government is not a shareholder of record.
Our motivation is to clarify the allocation of state-owned banks among controlling entities.
That might add color and detail to the picture of state-banking in Russia and underpin policy recommendations. The data sample collected on the basis of our definition of public sector can be used for subsequent empirical research.
A few papers dedicated to state-banking in Russia and its effects have emerged since 2007. Babayev [2007] , Glushkova and Vernikov [2009] and Vernikov [2009] discuss key definitions related to state banking, try to develop a comprehensive classification of public banks and to assess the size of public sector in terms of its market share of total bank assets.
Empirical research has already started covering selected aspects of state banking in Russia. Karas et al. [2008] find -surprisingly -that in Russia domestic public banks are no less efficient than private banks. Fungáčová and Poghosyan [2009] analyze interest margin determinants with a particular emphasis on the bank ownership structure and argue that state-controlled banks do not seem to take credit risk into account in their pricing strategy. Fungáčová et al. [2010] look into bank competition in Russia by measuring the market power and its determinants over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] and find no greater market power for state-controlled banks. Glushkova [2010] makes a very preliminary empirical assessment of behavior patterns and relative performance of state-owned banks vis-à-vis other groups of market participants. She finds that banks directly owned by state authorities display lower profit efficiency than private institutions, whereas banks indirectly owned by the state behave more or less like their private peers.
In this paper we collect bank-level statistics to reveal changes in the ownership structure of the banking industry and the techniques of ownership control. These issues are relevant for studies of comparative efficiency and performance of institutions with different ownership types.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces key definitions and a classification of state-influenced banks. Section 3 assesses the size of public sector and its main components. Section 4 addresses the interplay between ownership and control in indirectly state-owned banks. Section 5 suggests an outlook, and Section 6 concludes.
Public sector in Russian banking: Scope, definitions and classification
The main criterion of classifying a bank is the degree of control over its decision-making and lending policy by state authorities and managers in charge of public capital. Control can be exercised via equity ownership, via governance, or otherwise. We depict diverse forms of interaction between banks and the authorities in a classification scheme (Fig.1) .
Figure 1. Classification of state-influenced banks
* At least 50% of equity originates from public funds Group 1.1 -state-owned banks (hereinafter SOBs), or government-owned banks, or public banks, represents the center-piece of the suggested classification of state-influenced banks. SOB is a bank with state ownership exceeding 50%. In the literature one comes across more liberal criteria: La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer would recognize a bank as "governmentowned" if government holds at least 20% of equity but acts as the single largest shareholder [La Porta et al., 2002] . We define the category of state-controlled banks (group 1) more broadly than just SOBs to include as well banks that are governed by the state or its bodies in the absence of majority equity participation (state-governed banks -subgroup 1.2).
Banks in subgroup 1.1.1 are directly state-owned in the sense that that their major or sole shareholder is an executive body at the federal, regional or municipal level, or a CBR. Strictly speaking, however, Russian law provides three forms of ownership (public, municipal, and private ownership), so municipal property is not the same as state property. Banks in subgroup 1.1.2 are indirectly state-owned, because they are mostly capitalized by funds of public origin and do not belong directly to state authorities. We refer here to banks over 50% of whose equity belongs to companies and banks that are fully public property or have mixed public/private capital with prevalence of public funds.
The legal status of bank equity belonging to SOEs and SOBs remains blurred. There is no universally recognized methodology for classifying bank shares and participations as public or private, especially with regard to downstream holdings. Absence of the state (understood as federal-level authorities) among bank shareholders of record provides a formal basis for treating such a bank as private property. Commonsense would suggest that predominantly public origin of funds at the top-level company must reproduce the same form of ownership downstream.
Therefore a bank even at the bottom of the corporate control pyramid should also be regarded as public property. Not so in Russia. According to Law on Privatization and other pieces of legislation, public property invested in a subsidiary company or bank stops being public. A subsidiary bank of SOE is nominally private even if in essence it is not. From this viewpoint, for example, VTB24, the retail banking subsidiary of VTB bank, does not belong to state property and is a joint-stock company whose shares belong to another joint-stock company.
State control over a bank's activity can as well exist in the absence of majority equity participation. Absolute majority of "state-governed banks" (subgroup 1.2 "state-governed banks" in the classification depicted in Fig.1 ) are the failed financial institutions now run by the Deposit Insurance Agency (ASV).
Regardless of legal formalities, broad public often refers to indirectly SOBs as "quasi-state banks", i.e. para-statals. We do not think it is correct. A quasi-state bank is actually one that is broadly perceived as a SOB while not being one, so this term would for example fit VTB24 that technically does not belong to the state. Conversely, banks that are nominally private JSCs but are funded with public resources we prefer to call "quasi-private".
In order to develop a sample of SOBs, we screened individual banks for presence of public sector institutions among listed shareholders. No official publication contains data broken down by form of property in a way acceptable to us from a substantive viewpoint. Information sources included statutory disclosure by banks and their parent companies, annual and quarterly reports, CBR publications and website. Statistical data were borrowed from Interfax quarterly database of Russian banks, RBK rankings, and bank web-sites. By January 2010 our sample of stateowned banks consisted of 50 institutions ( Table 1) . Out of this number, 16 banks are stateowned in the legally strict sense: 4 of them are fully or majority owned by federal level authorities (federal government and the Central Bank of Russia) and 12 by regional authorities 3 .
Three banks belong to municipal authorities 4 . Full sample of SOBs is specified in [Vernikov, 2009b] . Constructing a data sample of stateowned banks is a continuous process. Since the release of our previous studies in NovemberDecember 2009 [Vernikov, 2009a; 2009b] some banks have changed hands, fell under state control or were divested from by state-owned companies. The combined market share of state-owned banks 6 reached its bottom of 30% or so in 1998
The growing share of indirectly state-owned banks
and then started to grow again. The recent financial crisis of 2008-9 catalyzed the process but certainly did not originate it. Over 2001-10 there was not even a single year-on-year decrease of state-owned banks' market share (Fig. 3) , and by January 2010 it reached 53.7%. There are alternative estimates of the same indicator ( Table 2) . Central Bank of Russia experts put the share of total assets held by state-controlled banks 7 at 40.6%, which is fairly close to our estimate under a narrow definition of state property (federal and regional authorities only). The gap of 12 percentage points between the CBR figure and our broad estimate is attributed to of SOEs, SOBs and "state corporations". We deem it essential to distinguish two main components within public sector, namely directly-SOBs and indirectly-SOBs. Among the 4 banks directly controlled by federal-level authorities, three are very large (Sberbank, VTB and Rosselkhozbank) . It is the assets of these "national champions" that drove upwards the share of directly-owned banks in Russia's total from 29.7% to 36.3%. The shares of banks controlled by regional and municipal authorities did not change much. The fastest-growing category was, however, the banks owned by public sector companies and banks. Their number grew from 19 to 31, and their share of total bank assets jumped from 4.0% to 13.1%. This led to a visible restructuring within the public sector, and contribution of indirectly state-owned banks has exceeded 25% (Fig.6 ). As for control, Bank Moskvy might be under decisive influence of its CEO and a few persons close to the Moscow city government.
Dilution of corporate control is more common yet in indirectly SOBs. Gazprombank, Russia's 3rd largest bank initially was under control of Gazprom, but by now Gazprom's stake has fallen below the level of direct control (41.73% of shares). Instead the bank's majority shareholder of record with 50% plus one share is now Gazfond, the Gazprom's pension fund; another 6.98% of shares belong to "OOO Novfintekh", Gazprombank's own subsidiary company. Who actually 9 Core SOBs have preferential access to public funds and enjoy a variety of other privileges, but have to perform special functions in addition to those routinely performed by all commercial banks, i.a.: (a) to allocate liquidity obtained from Finance Ministry and CBR among banks in the lower tier; (b) to acquire and hold non-core industrial assets deemed as strategic by state authorities; (c) to make long-term investment available to "systemically-important" enterprises and "strategic projects", including those with a social or political dimension like sport or congress facilities; (d) to provide first-aid funds to companies and regions hit by natural or technological disasters.
controls indirectly state-owned banks? In the case of Gazprombank, it is no longer its parent company (OAO Gazprom) or the government. The bank might be influenced by St.-Petersburgbased shareholders of Bank Rossiya who act through Lider management company that manages the assets of Gazfond, the bank's core shareholder of record.
We note two particular features inherent to indirectly SOBs: (a) public sector entities recur to circular ownership and control structures (Bank Moskvy and Stolichnaya strakhovaya gruppa own each other's shares, and so do Gazprombank and Novfintekh); and (b) Moscow city government can exercise full control over Bank Moskvy, but legally it is a minority shareholder.
Mutual ownership of shares was, and still is, broadly used in the private sector as a defense instrument against corporate raiders. Its usage in a public bank may mean that its affiliated persons do not fully trust existing mechanisms of ownership protection and, just in case, prefer to put in place additional defense against a possible suitor, including the state itself.
Indirect ownership is often organized through several levels, or tiers, of corporate control between a bank and its ultimate beneficiary owner. Indeed, we find growing evidence of multilevel holding structures with a large SOE or SOB at the top of the pyramid. In the corporate pyramid we see up to five intermediate ownership levels between a government entity and the equity stake in a downstream commercial bank. Each superior entity holds a controlling stake in the lower-level entity. We refer to two pieces of evidence, one related to holding structure within Gazprom group (Annex Fig.8 ) and the other to Russian Railways, the state-owned transportation monopoly (Annex Fig.9 Gazenergoprombank (an offspring of Gazprom) was brought into the rescue of Sobinbank and
Bank Soyuz. Khanty-Mansiysky Bank took over Novosibirsky municipalny bank.
There is no proof that asset quality in SOBs is radically higher than in other Russian banks.
Nevertheless SOBs were not allowed to fail during the crisis of 2008. The state remains liable for those banks, even if unknowingly and unwillingly.
What next?
The outlook embraces two trends with regard to governance structure in the public sector.
On the one hand, we expect indirect public ownership to expand organically (through faster growth of more flexible quasi-private banks) and through takeovers of failed private banks by SOEs and SOBs.
On the other hand, the state may divest from some of the banks it had to bail out and take over during the financial crisis of 2008-9. We anticipate state withdrawal initiatives to develop under the aegis of "privatization" and "replenishing budgetary funds". In the process of state withdrawal insiders will benefit. We already witness signals that the state would like to merge or sell some of the banks in order to eliminate duplication and to overcome managerial capability constraint in the public sector. VEB -Development Bank is looking for a strategic investment partner to launch Post Bank on the platform of Svyaz-Bank that it currently controls. It might also consider selling Globex-Bank into which RUB 80 billion of public funds have already been sunk.
After being rescued at public expense, Bank Soyuz will sell at significantly lower price one-half of its equity to Ingosstrakh insurance company belonging to the same beneficiary owner as before.
For a better understanding of "privatization" prospects, a brief reference to the history of The policy implication from our study is as follows. If the state cannot effectively control those banks and cannot make good use of them, it should impede public funds being invested in them. We would envisage a program aimed at removing bank equity stakes from SOEs and SOBs and transferring these stakes to the federal (which is preferable) and regional level of government, similarly to what happened to the equity stakes previously held by GUPs (state unitary enterprises) after such holdings were banned by law. It must be ruled out for SOEs and SOBs to establish their own "subsidiary" banks directly or via intermediate corporate vehicles, and existing corporate pyramids in the public sector must be dismantled. Instead a state bank holding could be set up to own and dispose of bank equity participations. This would render transparency and efficiency to the management of public funds and in future facilitate genuine privatizations, as different from fake privatizations and mere appropriation by insiders that constitute baseline scenario.
Conclusions and policy implications
As for directions for future research, we would mention:
• testing empirically whether indirectly SOBs perform better than directly SOBs and than domestic private banks;
• describing patterns of opportunistic behavior of public bank insiders; and
• developing methodology to assess the effect from state ownership on banks on a macro level. * A list of state-owned banks can be found in [Vernikov, 2009b] ; ** Including government of federal cities
Source: Author's calculations based on data from [CBR, 2009] , [Interfax, 2010] , [RBC, 2009] , and bank data.
Figure 8. Control structure in Gazprom group
Source: Bank data; corporate disclosure.
Figure 9. Control structure in Russian Railways group
Source: Bank data; corporate disclosure
